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Abstract 
This study examines the representation of the European Union (EU) and EU-Hungarian 
relations in the two largest daily newspapers in Hungary, Népszabadság and Magyar 
Nemzet. Focusing on the topic of the Hungarian national elections and the tenth 
anniversary of Hungary in the EU, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) was carried out on 
articles appearing between 1 March and 5 May 2014 to identify discourses on the EU and 
EU-Hungarian relations. My analysis found that both newspapers are consistent with their 
representational strategies, but contrasting in their respective discourses. Népszabadság 
presents a pro-European discourse with a representation of the EU as a social and political 
community, thereby projecting a positive attitude towards further European integration. 
Magyar Nemzet, meanwhile, represents the EU as a powerless actor, as a mere assistant in 
coordinating nation states. Instead, the nation state remains the only legitimate political 
actor while the EU is described as an external influence. The Hungarian state, the 
Hungarian government and Hungarian citizens are used synonymously and represented as 
one group. These strategies achieve a strengthening of Hungarian national identity and 
allegiance and disable a possible allegiance or identification with the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction          1 
 
2. European Integration and Hungary in the EU     2 
2.1.  European Integration and European Identity Politics   3 
2.2.  The 2004 Enlargement and Hungary     6 
2.3.  Hungarian Politics Today       9 
 
3. Methodological Discussion        12 
3.1.  Critical Discourse Analysis       12 
3.2.  News as Discourse        16 
3.3.  Material         19 
3.3.1. Népszabadság        20 
3.3.2. Magyar Nemzet        20 
3.3.3. Collection of Material       21 
 
4. Analysis and Discussion        23 
4.1.  The EU as an Economic Benefactor      23 
4.1.1. Népszabadság        23 
4.1.1.1.  Summary       26 
4.1.2. Magyar Nemzet        28 
4.1.2.1.  Summary       31 
4.2.  The EU as a Political Actor       32 
4.2.1. Népszabadság        33 
4.2.1.1. Summary       38 
4.2.2. Magyar Nemzet        39 
4.2.2.1.  Summary       44 
4.3. Implications to the Future of European Integration and EU-Hungarian 
Relations          47 
 
5. Conclusion          50 
 
6. Bibliography          53
1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Hungary joined the EU on 1 May 2004, along with nine other states. This date marks the 
biggest enlargement of the EU to date. This event has added a new dimension in the history 
of the EU, as it widened the debate on the notion of Europeanness and belonging to Europe 
with new and unique views on the matter. This debate stems from different perspectives all 
over Europe, varying from member-state to member-state. Case argues that the course of 
European history created a divide now termed variably as West and East, Old Europe and 
New Europe or even Core Europe and Non-core Europe.1 The discussion on what it means 
to be European for Hungary, therefore, needs to take into account specific features of 
Hungarian politics that reflect Hungary's position in the debate where binary oppositions of 
East and West, Old Europe and New Europe, national and supra-national power clash, and 
Europeanness is interpreted in so many diverse ways. The perplexing discourse of 
Hungarian politics, which many times dazzle the international public, is a useful ground to 
get a grasp on EU-Hungarian relations. 
 
I set out to examine what the European Union is represented to be in Hungary with a focus 
on Hungarian media. Hooghe and Marks claim that the media has a crucial role in 
influencing mass politics, and I therefore consider the analysis of media a relevant starting 
point to discover how discourse is shaped in Hungary in regards to the EU. 2 My chosen 
method is a critical discourse analysis performed on newspaper articles, as I expect that 
representations of the EU will be varied and salient there, and they reflect the Hungarian 
perspective more authentically than international media. The online versions of the two 
largest quality broadsheets, Magyar Nemzet and Népszabadság will give the material for 
the investigation. My focus will be to identify what roles are assigned to the EU by 
different media outlets, what differences (if any) can be seen between these 
representations, and what representational tools and techniques are used in relation to the 
EU. As Magyar Nemzet is traditionally associated with a centre-right perspective, and 
Népszabadság with a centre-left perspective, I expect to find notable differences between 
                                                 
1 
Case, Holly, “Being European: East and West,” in European Identity, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and 
Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 111-115. 
 
2 
Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks. “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2009): 10, 
accessed 18 Mar. 2014, http://lovisa.lub.lu.se. 
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their respective portrayals of the EU. This, in turn, should give an insight into varied 
discourse practices on the EU in Hungary from different angles of representation. 
 
My research question, therefore, is formed to address this issue: 
 
How are the EU and EU-Hungarian relations represented in Népszabadság and Magyar 
Nemzet?  
 
I set out to answer this question in order to understand what the debate on EU and EU-
Hungarian relations look like in the Hungarian media specifically. Although I cannot 
possibly analyse all media outlets, I expect that my study may give indications to the state 
of affairs as represented by the two largest Hungarian newspapers. This also implies that I 
am not attempting to address the complex question of the exact influence of media 
representation on mass politics, as it would require a much larger study. Rather, I aim to 
gain an insight into the current state of affairs of the EU and Hungary as represented by 
Hungarian media, with a special focus on the two largest Hungarian dailies. Consequently, 
my study may serve as a contribution to the research on national discourse building in 
regards to the EU, the notion of Europeanness, and EU membership as reflected in 
Hungarian media. 
 
 
2. European Integration and Hungary in the EU 
 
In order to understand connections of the European Union and Hungary, I will give a short 
account of the history of European integration with a special focus on European identity 
politics and the 2004 enlargement, along with a brief account of Hungarian politics today. 
The connection of my research interest and European identity politics may be explained by 
the close relation between identity, politics and discourse. Identity, politics and discourse 
are mutually constitutive, and by analysing discourse, I aim to gain an insight into how 
identity and politics shape and are shaped by discourse. The European dimension of my 
inquiry requires a specific account of European identity politics. As Hungary and EU-
Hungarian relations are the focus of my investigation, I consider it important to account for 
the relevant themes of the 2004 enlargement, as this event still has a great influence on 
European identity politics. This will be followed by a brief account of Hungarian politics 
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today to serve as a background to understanding my analysis. 
 
 
2.1. European Integration and European Identity Politics 
 
European integration has been characterised by its technocratic nature, initially intended to 
solve those problems that were present in post-war Europe at the end of the 1940s.3 
Bickerton states that in the first thirty years of European integration, it was an exclusively 
elite-driven process, away from the daily concerns of citizens in member states. This began 
to gradually change in the 1970s and continued through the 1990s until today.4 As Checkel 
and Katzenstein point out, while the strategy of de-politicisation of European integration, 
creating Europe by stealth, functioned well in the beginning, it produced a backlash that 
has increased over time.5 Bickerton attributes this to the gradual erosion of trust in national 
elites and a rise in citizen participation in politics from the early 1990s. This accelerated 
debates and political mobilisation among citizens who wished to understand by whom and 
how political decisions in the EU are made. The question of ‘who rules?’ became paired 
with citizens worrying about national sovereignty and national identity.6 Checkel and 
Katzenstein, however, identify a further disjuncture between elite-level politics and the 
masses. While elites were still searching for de-politicising Europe, mainly through the 
creation of the Eurozone and the European Central Bank, the effects of EU-policies started 
to filter down to the masses in more personal ways.7 This, together with citizens’ 
uncertainty on who is deciding over them, resulted in what Marks and Hooghe termed as 
                                                 
3 
 Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, “The Politicization of European Identities,” in 
European Identity, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
2. 
 
4 
 Christopher J. Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-states to Member States (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), accessed 10 Apr. 2014, http://lovisa.lub.lu.se, 4. 
 
5 
Checkel and Katzenstein, ”The Politicization of European Identities,” 2. 
 
6 
Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-states to Member States, 5-10. 
 
7 
Checkel and Katzenstein, ”The Politicization of European Identities,” 16. 
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constraining dissensus.8 The entrance of mass interests into politics, and the intense 
politicisation within nation states imposed a break on European integration “not because 
people have changed their minds, but because, on a range of vital issues, legitimate 
decision making has shifted from an insulated elite to mass politics. […] Even if 
preferences have not changed much, the game has”.9 
 
One result of the intense politicisation of European politics in member states was to make 
identity part of a political debate. In Checkel and Katzenstein’s definition 
 
[i]dentities refer to shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public 
debate, political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. 
They consist also of collective beliefs about the definition of the group and its 
membership that are shared by most group members. We understand identities to be 
revealed by social and geographical structures and national contexts.10 
 
The concept of identities, based on this definition, is complex and multi-layered. I see fit to 
adopt this definition, however, because it allows me to approach those aspects of identity 
that are relevant to my research. Shared representations of a collective self, group 
membership and social structures are all concepts that my analysis will take into account. 
The relevance of national context is also high because I am interested in investigating the 
national approach to the EU and EU-Hungarian relations as manifested in national news 
discourse. 
 
The explanation of the concept of identity, however, cannot be reduced to a simple 
definition. Complex and often conflicting interests influenced the development of identity-
politics ever since the issue entered the public debate. According to Checkel and 
Katzenstein, this was helped along by the fact that the 1991 Maastricht Treaty to the 2007 
                                                 
8 
Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” 5. 
 
9 
Ibid., 13. 
 
10 
Checkel and Katzenstein, ”The Politicization of European Identities,” 4. 
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Lisbon Treaty where elites focused on widening the scope of European politics still left 
everyday concerns of the masses unaddressed. This gap between the elite-driven European 
integration and the masses left opportunities for nation states and national conceptions of 
Europeanness to enter the political debate. The outcome was that “Europe, the EU and 
European identity have become focal points of contestation and politicisation; they are no 
longer topics reserved for experts”.11 Marks and Hooghe extend this argument by 
suggesting that the relevance of identity is high because it is actively mobilised by 
domestic politics. The depth of European integration is now such that it causes national 
barriers to break down, and mass immigration and economic competition to intensify. 
Political actors mobilise the tension that rises when a rapid jurisdictional change in the EU 
and relatively stable (national) identities clash. However, “[w]ether an issue enters mass 
politics depends not on its intrinsic importance, but on whether a political party picks it 
up.”12 This suggests a rather complex approach as to why identity matters in both domestic 
and European politics. 
 
Castiglione, on the other hand, approaches the issue from a different angle. He claims that 
the question has become whether and how much political power should be moved from the 
national to the supranational level. This resulted in clashing narratives where identification 
with the nation or with Europe are often represented as binary opposites by political parties 
that present the EU as a fearsome monster threatening national sovereignty and, by 
extension, national well-being. This debate has generated oppositions where European, 
national, and anti-European identities clash.13 In this account, identity politics is an 
instrument in the hands of nation states where the goal is to maintain national allegiance in 
order to preserve the form and function of the nation state, or in the hands of the European 
level to gain the loyalties of citizens. However, Castiglione further argues that political 
identification with the EU is unproblematic and does not need to rest on a definite 
conception of what it is to be European, mainly because of the modern transformation of 
                                                 
11 
Checkel and Katzenstein, ”The Politicization of European Identities,” 16. 
 
12 
Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” 18. 
 
13 
Dario Castiglione, “Political Identity in a Community of Strangers,” in European Identity, ed. 
Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 29-37. 
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conceptions of political identification and because the distinct nature of EU governance. 
Therefore, national, regional and European identities may coexist.14  
 
Castiglione addresses political identification in particular, while Checkel and Katzenstein 
describe political and social mechanisms of identification. Therefore, Castiglione’s 
account, I believe, is not contradictory to any of the above accounts, but rather serves as a 
complement. This dimension of political contest, where identity is a tool rather than the 
object of political contestation, gives a more balanced and diverse picture of identity 
politics in the EU. Bellucci et al. supplements this by suggesting that there seems to be a 
wide consensus on the fact that European integration may slow down or falter if a 
collective European identity is underdeveloped as it needs to survive the battering of 
nationalists and populist concerns voiced by member states.15 This sums up the basic 
importance of addressing the issue of identity politics in the EU. 
 
This brief account highlights the complexity of the mechanics of European identity 
politics. Against the backdrop of the evolution of European identity-politics, I identify 
three areas of interest to my research: the manifestation of identity in discourse, the level of 
political mobilisation detectable in this discourse and the specific dimension of EU-
Hungarian relations. The following two sections will address these issues in further detail. 
 
 
2.2. The 2004 EU Enlargement and Hungary  
 
The 2004 enlargement brought a new era of European politics, not only because the EU 
almost doubled its members, thus extending its power and territory across ten new 
member-states, but also because new, localised understandings of the EU and Europe 
entered into the public debate. What Europe and the EU meant for those joined in 2004 
(and most likely for those joining later on as well) is an issue that East and West dealt with 
quite differently. This debate is also connected to the issue of identity politics because self-
                                                 
14 
Ibid., 29-31. 
 
15 
Paolo Bellucci, et al., “Introduction: Antecedents and Consequences of European Citizenship,” in 
The Europeanization of National Polities?: Citizenship and Support in a Post-Enlargement Union, ed. David 
Sanders, Paolo Bellucci, Gábor Tóka, and Mariano Torcal, accessed 10 Apr. 2014, http://lovisa.lub.lu.se, 3-6. 
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definition of groups enter into the debate where the quest is to find their common 
Europeanness. 
 
According to Case, the East-Central European versions of European history, of always 
having belonged to, defended and represented Europe and European values, present a 
problematic dilemma for the West. These stories, based on localised memories of European 
history, cite a gentle criticism and an appeal to Western European states to accept and 
interact with how East-Central European states perceive their belonging to Europe. For the 
time being, however, overlooking or belittling the importance of these narratives is not 
only an error of snobbery alone, but is a political move.16 In fact, Case further argues that 
the oppositions of East and West serve as a tool to enable national elites to “associate or 
disassociate their nation’s course with/from that of their near or distant neighbours to 
achieve localised, generally ‘national’ goals”.17 
 
Mártonyi claims that the accession of East-Central European states to the EU is often 
portrayed as “a conversion to the value system of the Euro–Atlantic community of nations” 
but for Central-Eastern Europe, it is “rather like a homecoming: the return to the family 
these nations had been forcibly excluded from for too long. For generations of Central and 
Eastern Europeans, Europe meant a dream we had long cherished: about freedom, 
democracy and the rule of law.”18 
 
The differences of rhetoric on the newly joined member states’ accession to the EU 
depends, according to Case, on the fact that Europe was already an entity into which new 
member states could assimilate. This conception of Europe was based on localised or 
national experiences of already existing member-states. Conceptions of Europe by the 
East-Central European states joining the EU, however, differed from these experiences, 
and most crucially, were equally valid and had their historic origins. Case refers to these 
                                                 
16 
Case, ”Being European: East and West,” 111-115. 
  
17 
Ibid., 111. 
 
18 
János Mártonyi, “Europe, Central Europe and Hungary: 2014, a Year of Anniversaries,” Europe-
Asia Studies 66, no. 3 (2014): 361, accessed 25 Apr. 2014. 
 
8 
 
 
differing conceptions as “false oppositions between ‘East’ and ‘West’”19 This conflict, even 
if Case argues is based on false oppositions, is still relevant because it contributes to the 
discourse on how Eastern-Central Europeans imagine Europe and how this interacts with 
other, sometimes conflicting, views of Europe. 
 
Another approach to the question of the division of East and West is presented by 
Castiglione. He claims that enlargement produced rather paradoxical results in Eastern-
Central Europe because deep divisions between Western and Eastern Europe, or “Old” and 
“New” Europe undermined the optimistic conviction that joining the EU meant an 
affirmation of national sovereignty. Instead, it became part of the rising of Euro-scepticism 
and created a reluctant attitude to giving up newly gained national sovereignty to a 
supranational power.20 This suggests a rather different approach than that of Case. What 
Case calls false oppositions and sees as a tool in nation states’ hands to disassociate 
themselves from the EU, Castiglione sees as the reason why newly joined member states 
developed a certain amount of resistance to associating themselves with the EU. However, 
whether differences of East and West are causing Euro-scepticism or are only used by 
national elites to achieve localised goals, they still contribute to the discourse on what it 
means to be European and what kind of Europe Eastern-Central members imagined to join 
or imagine to bring about. 
 
Specifying what kind of Europe Hungary imagined to join is difficult, but there are some 
general pointers. Bozóki and Simon argue that the main political value in the beginning of 
the 1990s was freedom, both in its liberal and democratic senses. Liberal freedom, meaning 
the exercise of human rights and civil liberties, was paired with democratic values. 
Democracy was understood as a manifestation of popular sovereignty, because it meant no 
external influence in building a political community.21 Case confirms this by stating that 
Hungarian sentiments in the beginning of the 1990s were to build up a national identity 
                                                 
19 
Case, ”Being European: East and West,” 130-131. 
 
20 
Castiglione, “Political Identity in a Community of Strangers,” 37 
 
21 
András Bozóki and Eszter Simon, “Hungary since 1989,” in Central and Southeast European 
Politics Since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 210. 
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that was free from the oppression of communist regimes and where a renewed sense of 
national belonging would eventually lead to a return to Europe. Viktor Orbán, the current 
prime minister of Hungary, already then envisioned a European integration process that 
would not threaten national interests22 
 
Based on the above, the kind of Europe Hungary imagined joining was one where 
Hungarians were strengthened in their national identities and part of this is expressed by 
their adherence to democracy, European values and culture. This suggests that Hungarian 
self-identification viewed a European identity as a derivation from national identity, an 
inherent part of it, and not as an extension or replacement. Although this seems rather 
unproblematic in itself, it does create a specific discourse on Hungary’s membership and 
conceived identity within the European community. By conceiving democracy as the 
forum for nation-building based on self-definition and sovereignty, Hungarian politics 
seems to consider external influence a threat to this newly found freedom. This is in stark 
contrast with a conceived historic belonging to Europe and its manifestation, the EU. The 
issue, therefore, is not only the perceived difference between East and West, and their 
representations in discourse, but also how Hungarian elites define or utilise this in their 
respective rhetoric and how they portray Hungarian identity and Hungary’s belonging to 
the EU. 
 
 
2.3. Hungarian Politics Today 
 
The parties that have played a role in Hungarian politics since 1990 may be placed on a 
left-right ideological line. The far left is represented by the Workers’ Party and the 
Communist Party, neither of which has seats in the parliament. The socialist parties are 
MSZP (The Socialist Party) who governed between 1994-1998 and 2004-2010, and 
MSZDP (Hungarian Social Democratic Party), the latter of which is an extra-parliamentary 
minor party. SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) is a liberal party which was part of three 
governments in alliance with MSZP.23 LMP (Politics Can Be Different) is a relatively new 
                                                 
22 
Case, ”Being European: East and West,” 126-130. 
 
23 Bozóki and Simon, “Hungary since 1989,” 213-16. 
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green-liberal party, which has been represented in the parliament since 2010.24 
 
The conservative side is represented by Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), MDF 
(Hungarian Democratic Forum), FKGP (Independent Smallholders’ Party) and KDNP 
(Christian Democratic People’s Party).  FKGP slowly declined and since 2002 does not 
have an influence in Hungarian politics. MDF is a minor party now, although it was the 
major winner of the first elections in 1990. The far right was first represented by MIÉP 
(Party of Hungarian Life and Justice), but since 2002 it has no impact on Hungarian 
politics, while its agenda has been largely adopted by Jobbik (Movement for a Better 
Hungary) recently.25 
 
The first multi-party elections after the fall of the Soviet Union were held in 1990, with 
more than fifty parties participating.26 As a result of the elections, six parties won seats in 
the parliament, with the centre-right coalition of MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), 
KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party) and FKGP (Independent Smallholders’ 
Party) as the winner.27 Up until 2006, all successive governments lost elections, which 
Bozóki and Simon attribute to the general pessimistic attitude of Hungarian voters and to 
the fact that the performance of each government left Hungarians disappointed.28 
 
Consequently, in 1994, the left-liberal coalition of MSZP (The Socialist Party) and SZDSZ 
(Alliance of Free Democrats) won, while in 1998 a centre-right coalition won again, this 
time consisting of Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), MDF and FKGP, with Viktor 
Orbán as prime minister. In 2002, MSZP and SZDSZ won again and also managed to win a 
re-election in 2006 and thus governed for eight years until 2010. In 2010, however, the 
centre-right coalition of Fidesz and KDNP was victorious again, this time gaining 67,88% 
of the seats in the parliament and Viktor Orbán was appointed prime minister for the 
                                                 
24 
“Országgyűlési Képviselők Választása 2014. április. 6 Eredmények,” last modified 28 Apr. 2014. 
http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html 
 
25 Ibid, 213-216. 
 
26 Bernard A. Cook, ed., Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia, vol. 2, (New York: Garland Publishing, 
Inc.), 593-594. 
 
27 Ibid., 593-594. 
 
28 Ibid., 214. 
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second time.29 The latest elections, which were held on April 6, 2014, granted a third term 
in office for Viktor Orbán and his government-coalition (Fidesz-KDNP) with 133 seats, 
roughly equalling with two-thirds, of the parliament. The centre-left alliance set up 
specifically for the 2014 elections was named Unity and won 38 seats, Jobbik, the 
Hungarian extreme-right populist party 23, while LMP (green-liberalists) received 5 
seats.30 
 
The currently governing party (2014-2018), Fidesz, was formed in 1988 in Budapest.31 
Bozóki and Simon describe Fidesz as the leading right wing force ever since the 1990s. In 
the beginning, it was a small liberal party which became a centre-right conservative party 
by the mid-1990s and added “Hungarian civic party” to its name. 32 33 In the wake of the 
1998 elections, Fidesz gained office for the first time, and Viktor Orbán became prime 
minister in a coalition with MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) and FKGP (Independent 
Smallholders’ Party).34 Bozóki and Simon suggest that already in that period, Fidesz 
“wished to reserve membership in the nation only for those who shared its ideological 
views and by 2002 had made some alarmingly rightist statements”.35  
 
In the 2014 elections, similarly to the second term of the Orbán government (2010-2014), 
two-thirds of the parliament seats (133) were awarded to Fidesz-KDNP and Orbán was 
named prime minister for the third time. According to Orbán, these results are a European 
                                                 
29 
“2010. Évi Országgyűlési Képviselő Választás 2. fordulója - 2010. április 25 Eredmények,” last 
modified 11 May, 2010. http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/parval2010/354/354_0_index.html 
 
30 
“Országgyűlési Képviselők Választása 2014. április. 6 Eredmények,” last modified 28 Apr. 2014. 
http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html 
 
31 
“A Fidesz Története,” last modified 27 Mar. 2006. http://archiv.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=60 
 
32 
Bozóki and Simon, “Hungary since 1989,” 215. 
 
33 
“A Fidesz Története,” 
 
34 
Ibid. 
 
35 
Bozóki and Simon, “Hungary since 1989,” 215 
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record and they are a clear statement from the Hungarian voters that they support his 
policies on creating jobs, supporting families and fighting for national sovereignty. He also 
claimed that Hungarians reinforced that they should stay in the EU, but only if they have a 
strong national sovereign government.36  
 
 
3. Methodological discussion 
 
As my interest lies in understanding how the EU and EU-Hungarian relations are 
represented in media, I will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with a specific focus on 
newspaper discourse as a method for my investigation. By starting with a more general 
discussion, I will lay out the underlying themes of CDA, which will then be narrowed 
down to specifics of newspaper discourse analysis to fit my purpose. 
 
 
3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse is practical, social and cultural; language users accomplish social acts and 
participate in social interaction. “Such interaction is embedded in social and cultural 
contexts and has a purpose”.37 This interactional angle of discourse accentuates that 
discourses exist in a wide social context rather than isolated. Social and cultural factors 
influence the production and nature of discourse, as do language users who engage in the 
production and reception of discourse. These aspects all invite an analysis that takes into 
account the social contexts of discourse and not only linguistic analysis. This implies a 
more complex approach to text analysis and indicates an interest of what happens outside 
the realms of texts, how they are connected to social reality and how they produce and 
reproduce it. 
 
Texts are a constitutive part of the social world and have causal effects. They bring about 
                                                 
36 
”Viktor Orban Claims Victory in Hungarian Election,” Euronews, 7 Apr.2014, accessed 8 Apr. 2014, 
http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/07/viktor-orban-claims-victory-in-hungarian-elections/ 
 
37 
Teun A. van Dijk, ”Discourse as Interaction in Society,” in Discourse studies: a multidisciplinary 
introduction. Vol. 2, Discourse as Social Interaction, ed. Teun A. van Dijk (London: SAGE, 1997), 2-3. 
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changes in our knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, values, in social relations and the material 
world. These changes, however, are not simply based on a cause-and-effect mechanism.38 
Fairclough suggests that theories of social constructivism are overly idealistic in their 
approach to texts (language and discourse) as they do not differentiate between 
“construction” and “construal”. We may construe the social world by representations or 
even imagination, but whether our representations are really influential in changing the 
structure of social constructions depend on a variety of factors. At the same time, social 
institutions set the limits and affects discursive constructions that may have an effect on 
them. Thus, prevailing social reality and the power of who is construing (representing) 
these social constructions has a significance as to what extent they will be affected by 
them.39 Assuming that the European Union is such a social construction, this suggests that 
although there is a mutual constitutiveness between the EU as an institutional structure and 
its representations, the ultimate impact of these representations will be based on who 
produces these contruals and what social context these representations appear in. This leads 
to two vital aspects of critical discourse analysis: power and context. 
 
Power is a central concept in critical discourse analysis, as it organises many of the 
relationships between discourse and society.40 The kind of power that is relevant here is the 
power that decides relations between groups or institutions, and personal power as far as 
individuals act as part of a group. Much power that is connected to discourse is not 
coercive but mental.41 “That is, the discourses of a powerful group may be such that others 
will form the intentions and accomplish the acts as if they were totally without constraints, 
and consistent with their own wants and interests.”42 This kind of social power is often 
referred to as hegemonic power, and the crucial question is how this is implemented in 
                                                 
38 
Norman Fairclough, Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 8-10. 
 
39 
Ibid., 8-9. 
 
40 
van Dijk, ”Discourse as Interaction in Society,” 16. 
 
41 
Ibid., 17. 
 
42 
Ibid., 19. 
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society.43 Van Dijk suggests that 
 
in order to exercise hegemonic power and in order to establish consensus, powerful 
groups control the actions of others through controlling the minds (knowledge, 
attitude, ideologies) of groups, and they largely do so through discourse. This, 
however, presupposes another fundamental aspect of the relations between power 
and discourse, namely access. […] Thus, the various power elites control (the 
access to) many types of public discourse, for instance in politics and the 
administration, the media and so on.44 
 
Public discourse, thus, will also be shaped according to what the powerful wish to be 
included or, more importantly, not included in it. What does, or does not, reach the public 
has a profound effect on what their social reality is based on. In turn, this will shape public 
opinion to a large extent. 
 
Another influential aspect of discourse is the notion of context. What context discourses 
are embedded in may give an indication of their ability to construct social reality. Similarly 
to discourse itself, contexts are not fixed or pre-ordained and nor are they objective. 
Contexts are shaped by discourses as discourses are a structural part of them. Discourse 
and context mutually shape each other. Similarly, discourse is not objective, and nor are 
contexts. Social facts are understood individually and are made relevant by and for 
participants.45 Individuals try to make sense of them and thus engage in meaning-making.46 
As a result, contexts may be defined as mental constructs and are connected to meaning-
making.47 Meaning derives from three separate elements of discourse, namely the 
production, the text itself and the reception. In other words, the social position of the 
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producer, the different components of the text and the knowledge and values of the 
receiver all interact in the interpretation of a text.48 “This also explains the vital link 
between discourse and context: as subjective representations, mental models of contexts 
may thus directly monitor the production and comprehension of talk and text.”49 Therefore, 
not only linguistic form, but processes of meaning-making and contexts are also 
constituent parts of shaping social reality. 
 
Finally, there is another aspect of discourse that needs addressing, namely ideology. In van 
Dijk’s definition, ideologies are the cognitive counterparts of power and serve a 
coordinative purpose between the acts and practices of individuals as members of social 
groups. They have a social and a cognitive function as they tell people what their social 
position is and what to think of social issues.50 Ideologies also define how groups are 
related to other groups and how they are positioned in complex societal structures. “It is 
this prevalent, overall self-definition or social identity that is acquired and shared by group 
members in order to protect the interests of a group as a whole.”51 Ideologies, therefore, are 
closely connected to identities and group representations. According to van Dijk, 
ideological analysis needs to focus on discourse structures that exhibit group goals or 
interests rather than personal views and creates ingroups and outgroups and defines their 
association with good and bad. Representation, thus, focuses on our good things and their 
bad things, while de-emphasises our bad things and their good things. Van Dijk calls this 
the principle of the ideological square of positive self-representation and negative other-
representation.52 
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3.2. News as Discourse 
 
Building on the basic elements of critical discourse analysis I addressed above, I need to 
narrow down my focus in order to fit my aims and scope of analysis. The specific genre I 
set out to investigate is newspaper discourse, and thus my analysis needs to take specific 
features into account. I adopt Richardson’s approach, who focuses specifically on 
discourse of newspaper articles, or as he refers to this, news discourse. As I detected a large 
overlapping between the concept of news and other newspaper articles in Richardson’s 
account, I will also use the concept of news discourse analysis to refer to any discourse 
analysis performed on articles appearing in a newspaper. This also allows me to extend my 
analysis to any articles appearing in my chosen newspapers, which will give a more 
inclusive result during my data collection and analysis. 
 
Richardson’s approach to news discourse analysis is “founded on the assumption that 
journalism exists to enable citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in 
the world”.53 This function, however, does not exclude its role in reporting the events of 
the world and the actions of the powerful in ways that are both entertaining and 
consumable. Although this suggests that newspapers are businesses in which journalistic 
texts are products, the conclusion of news discourse analysis should reach far further than 
this statement. Discursive practices of news are far more complex than establishing 
newspapers as commodities and audiences as consumers.54 
 
Analysing the discursive practices of journalistic discourse requires treating them as a 
“two-way street”.55 The producer and mode of production of news encode meaning into the 
texts. This may happen for instance with selecting stories, by foregrounding one view over 
another or even by choosing one word over another. The text also influences the producer, 
due to the conventions of the genre of news production. The interpretation – or decoding – 
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of the texts depends excessively on the reader, however. Individuals read and interpret texts 
differently, based on their perspectives, backgrounds and previous knowledge. In addition, 
they also assess the meaning by their judgements of who produced the text, as people tend 
to believe the information given by people or institutions they trust. The reader also 
influences the production of texts as the producer always keeps in mind the target audience 
and their preferences.56 This seemingly complex system of news production needs another 
dimension that would add a critical quality to the analysis of news texts.  
 
As critical discourse analysis aims at discovering “how discourse (language in use) relates 
to and is implicated in the (re)production of social relations”57 and the social dimension of 
text production needs to be taken account as well. Richardson suggests that society and 
news discourse effect and shape each other mutually; they are in a dialectical 
relationship.58 Society is the background that creates structures and facilitates news 
production. There is also a dialectical relationship between the consumption of news and 
social practices as readers engage their social background in decoding the meaning of news 
discourse. These dialectical relationships suggest that news as discourse is shaped by and 
reflect on social realities while they also have the power to shape the social practices of 
individuals. 
 
To be useful in my analysis, there is a need to translate this quite abstract discussion into 
practical terms. I adapt the approach suggested by van Dijk, who states that there is an 
increasing tendency to distinguishing the local or interactional context and a global or 
societal context in discourse analysis.59 Local and global levels spell out the overarching 
dimensions of discourse into tangible components. Van Dijk suggests to identify three 
aspects of local and global levels present in discourse: meaning, form and context.60 
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Global meaning, or semantic macrostructures, has to do with analysing the topic and 
topical arrangements within the text.61 Local meaning is discernable by studying the 
meaning of words, the structure of propositions, implications, allusions and vagueness in 
texts. Meaning is the most closely connected to influencing the opinions and attitudes of 
readers and thus have the most obvious social consequences. Furthermore, both the local 
and global meanings are expected to reveal an overall strategy of positive self-presentation 
and negative other-presentation and thus are connected to identity.62 
 
Global forms of discourse are the superstructures of texts that are defined by genre 
categories; in this case, it means the organisation of the text in order to fit into the category 
of news articles. Local form involves (but is not exclusive to) the analysis of syntax, 
pronominal relations, active-passive voice and nominalisations. Formal attributes are not as 
closely connected to the text’s ideological work because they are less consciously 
controlled by the writer.63 
 
Context, the most discussed feature of discourse so far, also needs two levels of 
observation. The global level of my context analysis, in this case, is the social, political and 
cultural structures I demonstrated in the Introduction. The local level has to do with the 
immediate, interactional situation of the communicative event, and helps define what is 
relevant to the social situation for the participants.64 
 
My analysis, addresses both the topical arrangement of texts, the semantic analysis of 
words, and the use of presuppositions and implications since this is the aspect, according to 
the above, that has most influence on readers. Apart from these, I also look at the structure 
                                                                                                                                                    
Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), 98-113. 
 
61 
Ibid., 101-103. 
 
62 
Ibid., 98-106. 
 
63 
Ibid., 106-108. 
 
64 
Ibid., 108-113. 
 
19 
 
 
of propositions, the active-passive voice and transitivity (who does what to whom). With 
the combined analysis of these aspects, and by referencing my findings to social and 
political aspects of my inquiry, I hope to gain an understanding of how the Hungarian 
mainstream news media help shape the knowledge, attitudes and opinions of the Hungarian 
public. 
 
 
3.3. Material  
 
The material for my analysis is taken from the online versions of the two largest dailies in 
Hungary, the left-leaning Népszabadság and the right-leaning Magyar Nemzet available at 
www.nol.hu and www.mno.hu. I consider these two newspapers to be appropriate for my 
study because they are both printed and distributed nationally, are written in Hungarian and 
are addressed to a Hungarian audience (even including Hungarians living outside the 
national borders). Newspapers as part of the Hungarian national media are suitable for my 
investigation because, as Hooghe and Marks suggest, national media content is crucial in 
shaping public opinion.65 In addition, as Fairclough claims, texts are a constitutive part of 
the social world and influence people’s opinions, beliefs and knowledge.66 My interest lies 
in what kind of representations appear of the EU and EU-Hungarian relations and how 
newspapers shape the discourse on these topics. 
 
I have chosen to investigate the online versions because they are easily accessible and 
because specific search criteria can be applied through the search engine of the sites. My 
choice to include these, and not other Hungarian newspapers, depends on two factors. 
Firstly, a larger data sample including other newspapers would require more time to 
analyse, and would require a larger study. As time restrictions allow me to process only a 
limited amount of data, I needed to narrow down my focus. As a derivation of this, my 
priority is to collect data from newspapers that are most likely to have the biggest impact 
on Hungarian public opinion. Based on the discussion in the previous section, I expect that 
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Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet are best suited to analyse because they have the largest 
readership and circulation in Hungary, in addition to representing two different ideologies, 
centre-left and centre-right respectively. 
 
 
3.3.1. Népszabadság 
 
Népszabadság was first published under the name of SzabadNép in 1942, at that time 
illegally. After seven illegal issues published, it became legally distributed 1945. In 1956, it 
changed name to Népszabadság and became the Socialist Workers Party’s official paper. 
Up until 1989, the newspaper was led by the party, but in 1990 it became a joint stock 
company and changed its label to be a socialist daily. After four years, the socialist label 
was abandoned and changed to be a “national daily”. In 2001, the Swiss Ringier Publishing 
House bought a 49.9 percent stake and today, it is owns a 70.77 percent stake.67 
Népszabadság defines itself as independent from political movements and parties, left-
oriented liberal modern daily newspaper. It has the largest pool of journalists in Hungary 
and has 300 000 readers.  The online version is described to be a quality news portal and a 
complement to the printed version of the newspaper.68 
 
 
3.3.2. Magyar Nemzet 
Magyar Nemzet is slightly more difficult to define in details, as there is very little 
verifiable data that is available to the public about the newspaper. Although I have directly 
asked the editorial office to send me details about the newspaper, I did not get a reply. 
The newspaper’s history, however, began in 1938, when it started with the motto: “The 
Hungarian nation fights for Hungary to stay Hungarian.” It was banned in 1944 with the 
German occupation but started again after the war, and became the newspaper of the 
People’s Patriotic Front, which was a non-communist but state approved organisation. 
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During the Cold-War years, it served as the newspaper of the intelligentsia. After 1989 the 
newspaper became privatised as well.69 Today, Magyar Nemzet is labelled as a “civic 
daily” and is the second largest newspaper in Hungary. It serves as the main platform for 
conservative journalism in the Hungarian press.70 
 
 
3.3.3. Collection of material 
Because of time restrictions, I set the data collection period between 1 March and 5 May 
2014. The articles that gave the data for my analysis were found through the search engines 
of the newspapers’ online versions. I have set three criteria for narrowing down the number 
of articles to an amount that is sufficient for my scope and aims. The first criteria was that 
the articles had to be found through the search engine of the respective sites and include 
the terms ‘Hungary-EU, ‘Hungarian-EU’, ‘EU-Hungarian’ ‘EU’ and ‘European Union’. 
The second criteria I set was that the EU, European politics or EU-Hungarian relations 
needed to be an indispensable part of the article, i.e., the meaning or overall message of the 
article would have been lost if the paragraphs about the EU, European politics or EU-
Hungarian relations were omitted. This enabled me to liquidate articles from my dataset 
that only mentioned these in passing but were not integral parts of the texts. Many articles 
contained the word ‘European’ in a completely different context, for instance sports or 
financial news. These were also eliminated because they did not carry any direct 
implications to my interest in this study. The third criteria was to limit the number of 
articles to be analysed by omitting repetitive articles. I encountered several articles that 
were based on the same source and reported on the same events with some variation on the 
amount of information disclosed. I consider this a naturally occurring phenomenon as 
online news media are interactive and constantly updated in order to give immediate 
coverage of the news of the world, as opposed to print media which is not as easily updated 
or altered. 
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My selected time frame also meant that major events that took place at this time was likely 
to be largely represented in the newspaper. After my search terms were applied, I found 
that three events were widely represented among the articles: the Hungarian national 
elections, the tenth anniversary of Hungary joining the EU in 2004, and the upcoming EU 
parliamentary elections on 25 May, 2014. In order to narrow down my focus, I have chosen 
to collect articles that were about two of these main topics: the national elections in 
Hungary in April 2014 and the 10th anniversary of Hungary joining the EU. The choice of 
topics was based on Checkel and Katzenstein’s claim that national elections serve as 
platform to politicise Europe and European identity and belonging.71 Discourse on the 
national elections, therefore, should reveal patterns of representations on the EU and EU-
Hungarian relations. The second topic was chosen because the 10th anniversary of the 2004 
Enlargement received an extensive coverage in international media, paired with a vast 
promotion effort from the EU institutions, signalling the significance of this event in 
today’s Europe. As I am interested in the Hungarian representation of the EU, and 
European integration by extension, the commemoration of the very event that enabled this 
subject of inquiry (the accession of Hungary to the EU) seems to be a suitable topic to 
investigate. The decision to exclude the third large topic (the EU elections) was based on 
the fact that my time restrictions did not allow me to extend my data collection period, and 
this meant that most articles covering this event were likely to appear after my set time 
limit of 5 May, 2014. 
 
There were two decisions concerning the analysis of the online versions I needed to make, 
both depending on the fact that the online version differs from the printed version of texts. 
A feature that I spotted in some articles of the online version of Magyar Nemzet were links 
embedded into the text of the article. This feature allows readers to click on certain words 
within the text and be transferred to related articles elsewhere on the website. This is a 
feature that was only present in Magyar Nemzet and not in Népszabadság and was 
therefore ignored during the analysis. Nonetheless, it is worthy to mention that these links 
might be of importance in an extended analysis as they highlight certain words the writer 
deemed important in the context. The second feature was also unique to Magyar Nemzet, 
one that I would call an information box placed next to the text, highlighted with a separate 
background colour. These short blocks of texts were related to the articles but not inherent 
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part of them, as the separation of colours also showed. The content was mostly aimed at 
explaining certain terms in the article that readers might have a problem comprehending. 
As this feature was also missing from Népszabadság, I decided to exclude them from the 
analysis. 
 
 
4. Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
4.1. The EU as an Economic Benefactor 
 
The topic of economy is salient in both newspapers when writing about Hungary’s tenth 
anniversary in the EU. This is understandable as economic progress is measurable within a 
ten-year span and it is closely associated with citizens’ well-being. However, the 
prominence of this topic overshadows other aspects of EU membership and is part of the 
discussion even when other aspects (governance, democracy, geo-political considerations) 
are considered in this set of articles. 
 
The two newspapers differ in their topical structures within the overall topic of Hungary’s 
tenth anniversary in the EU, and these topical structures have an implication as to what is 
considered important when presenting the subject, and this in turn has a great influence on 
how the actors and events are represented. Actors such as the Hungarian government and 
the European Union are given very different roles, as are the Hungarian public, and the 
other nine states that joined the EU at the same time. All of these representations add up to 
an almost contrasting picture of the way the event of Hungary’s accession to the EU is 
pictured. 
 
 
4.1.1. Népszabadság 
 
In Népszabadság, the analysed articles all contained a discussion on the economic benefits 
of being an EU member for Hungary and Hungarian people. Making this distinction is 
significant. Dividing the political unit of Hungary and the Hungarian people into two 
actors (or group of actors), the representation achieves a separation of a unity that would 
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seem self-evident otherwise: the Hungarian people is not equal to Hungary as a unit and 
vice versa.  As a result, while the economic benefits received from the EU are discussed, 
there is an attempt to separate the social from the political benefits of economic progress. 
The first is represented by a discussion on living standards, the second is represented by a 
discussion on investments, capital, GDP, trade and other economic factors. On the other 
hand, it is fairly difficult to completely separate these two dimensions as economic growth 
influences living standards and living standards are connected to economic progress as 
buying power of citizens grows. Nevertheless, the separation is achieved by the level of 
abstraction in the representation.  
 
Social benefits are elaborated on in terms of living standards which are never represented 
by concrete numbers or measurable facts. In the article titled European Supermarketunion, 
Pócs represents social differences of Eastern and Western Europeans by elaborating on 
shopping experiences.72 Western European pensioners out on their shopping trips are 
described as well-dressed, cheerful and well-groomed, and they own modern and well-
tended cars. The Eastern Europeans, on the other hand, are represented as the jealous 
spectators only hoping to achieve this standard of living. This motif reappears in other 
articles as well. A left-wing politician is quoted talking about affordable food, wages and 
pensions above subsistence levels and youth employment, while a Jobbik-politician is 
quoted blaming Western European multinational corporations for giving too low wages in 
their Hungarian branches .73 74 In another article, Hungarian doctors’ wages are compared 
to Check doctors’ wages, and is implied that higher wages bring higher social and living 
standards with a more developed sense of democratic participation.75 Lastly, in the article 
entitled Invisible Birthday, the living standards are described to be “faraway from 
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European standards”.76 Because these are all phrased by immeasurable terms, the focus is 
not on exact numbers or figures but on notions that are deemed prominent when describing 
the social aspects of economic integration. 
 
Political benefits enabled by EU funding, on the other hand, are represented in terms of 
measurable outcomes and less abstract concepts such as GDP, numeral representation of 
invested capital, and the statistics of developing political regions. What makes it possible 
to talk about political benefits of economic integration separately from social benefits is 
the focus on Hungary as an economic competitor with other newly joined member states. 
This elevates the description of economic features to the political entity of the state, 
especially in those cases when states are described in terms of their economic policies.  
 
In an article entitled EU-accession: Quickly Changing Success-stories, Hungary is 
identified as a rather unsuccessful actor while the EU is characterised as the source of 
opportunities and as profitable to members.77 This profitable membership, however, is 
represented in a square where Hungary is compared to other states that accessed the EU at 
the same time. In this comparison, Hungary is depicted to have limited success while the 
others, despite obstacles, managed to take advantage of the economic integration and 
developed. This seems to be a rather surprising outcome, given that Hungary is 
interchangeably used with the pronoun “we”, where “we” denotes Hungary as a political 
group.78  
 
Van Dijk describes the ideological square where representation of “we” (the in-group) is 
attributed with positive self-representation by emphasising our good characteristics or 
actions and denying or ignoring our bad characteristics or actions, while “the other” (out-
group) is given a negative other-presentation with an emphasis on their bad characteristics 
or actions and ignorance of their good characteristics or actions.79 According to this, “we”, 
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Hungary, should be represented as positively as possible while “the others” should be 
characterised negatively. The opposite is observable in this case. A viable explanation is 
that Hungary as a political unit is represented in order to highlight the failings of the 
political leaders to make use of the advantageous economic climate. In the article, EU 
funding and regional integration is described in terms of figures and numbers and is 
claimed to have been used better by the others. In addition, the recent financial crisis is 
depicted to have caused serious difficulties in all these states, but Hungary was the first to 
file for IMF help. Meanwhile, the other member states, despite their equally difficult 
situation, managed to overcome their financial problems. Although it is discernable that 
Hungary did progress during the last ten years, this achievement fades when compared to 
“the others”.80 So the representation of Hungary as a rather unsuccessful state might have 
an underlying ideological motive, and that is to criticise the government’s actions and 
economic policies.  
 
Furthermore, the EU is described with metaphors of a well-functioning immune system in 
the same article. The EU has a “safety umbrella” to protect the body of the member states 
against external threats, and the economic structure that the EU helped to bring about is 
described as “healthy”.81 In addition, both the EU and the IMF are represented as helpers 
in times of economic difficulty, suggesting that their support generates a better outcome.82 
 
 
4.1.1.1. Summary 
 
The above analysis showed two separate benefits attributed to EU membership: social and 
political. The social benefits are based on two perspectives. The first is the basic 
suggestion that living standards in Hungary are not solely based on membership in the EU 
and the other is that EU funding should have brought a more marked effect on Hungarian 
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people’s economic situation. Both of these are subtle and unsaid criticisms to the current 
and past governments’ ability to use EU funding for the benefit of the people. The EU is 
described as the wasted opportunity and a social structure of Western European states to be 
admired and whose standards are worth to aim to reach. Hungarian people are in no way 
represented to be the losers of economic integration, rather as bystanders waiting to be 
given the possibility to feel the benefits of economic integration and EU funding. 
 
The political benefits of Hungary’s EU membership are described with different tools. The 
EU’s representation is based on the concept of the EU as a source of economic 
development and as a safeguard from economic failure. This representation is achieved by 
presuppositions that suggest that EU membership is profitable and that EU membership is 
desirable despite economic obstacles in the last years. An implication of the beneficial 
nature of cooperation between newer member states also underlines this.  
 
Apart from these representations of the EU, the representation of Hungary itself is relevant 
here because it is likely to have an implication on Hungarian public opinion. As I stated 
above, there is a distinction between the representations of Hungary as a political entity 
and the Hungarian people as a group. This distinction suggests that Hungarian individuals 
are not equal to the Hungarian state and are treated as a separate social group. As a result, 
Hungarian people as a group assume separate identity characteristics from that of the 
Hungarian state. This view denies that all Hungarians with a Hungarian citizenship are 
defined by a collective identity based on the political conception of citizenship and 
suggests that Hungarian identity can exist outside of this type of identification. By 
allowing this separation, this representation also suggests that the monopole of identity-
creation does not reside with the nation state and social groupings are as relevant as 
political ones.  
 
As this newspaper is traditionally associated with a left-wing ideology and as the current 
government is right-wing, this representation might have an effect on the readers that 
already tend to disagree with the policies of the current government. These readers are 
more disposed to accept a conception of multiple identities which are based on other 
identity formation processes than what the state utilizes. Furthermore, since the 
representation of the EU in relation to the social group of Hungarian people suggests that 
the political entity of Hungary is failing to enable them to take advantage of the 
28 
 
 
opportunities offered by EU membership, they might find it more suitable to bypass an 
identification with the political entity of the Hungarian state and turn directly to the one 
where their opportunities are more salient. This may result in a more positive attitude 
towards a European identity than to what is on offer in Hungary. 
 
 
4.1.2. Magyar Nemzet 
 
The same overall topic of economic benefits of EU membership is treated quite differently 
in Magyar Nemzet. Here, as I mentioned earlier, the topic is salient in the articles 
discussing the tenth anniversary of Hungary’s accession as well. The general representation 
of the economic benefits of being an EU member is represented to be unquestionable. 
There is also a suggestion that the Hungarian membership did not use the economic 
advantage to its fullest, the reasons behind this are represented dissimilarly to how 
Népszabadság treated the question.  
 
The main reasons for Hungary failing to take full advantage of EU benefits are implied by 
Magyar Nemzet to be too weak political rule in Hungary before Fidesz took over and the 
fact that the EU opposed Hungarian suggestions or economic policies. 83 84 These two 
motifs reoccur regularly, along with an emphasis on Hungary’s ruling party as the 
successful executor of Hungarian economic policies and as a successful winner of EU 
funding.85 86 A rather unrepresentative article of the dataset citing José Manuel Barosso and 
Martin Schulz on the tenth anniversary of the 2004 enlargement does not mention Hungary 
individually, but focuses on the benefits of EU membership for all those joining in 2004.87 
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However, this article also presents EU membership largely in terms of economic benefits 
for members, again, underlined with facts and figures.88 The overall representation of EU-
membership for those states joining in 2004, therefore, suggests that economic benefits are 
considered most important even by politicians representing the EU level. This underlines 
the tendencies presented elsewhere in the articles in the dataset. 
 
Articles pondering the question of whether Hungary’s accession was beneficial, the answer 
is positive, and this answer is supported by factual data, numbers and statistics showing the 
economic benefits and progress of the country.89 90 The positive self-representation of the 
Hungarian government utilizes these data to support that their governance is aimed at 
making the most of EU membership. In the article discussing Hungary’s so called 
“Eurorealistic politics”, Fidesz is claimed to have achieved the most in terms of 
compliance with the Maastricht Criteria, first in 2001 during their first term of governance, 
then again in their second and third term since 2010.91 Furthermore, the last four years in 
the EU are represented in terms of the accomplishments the Hungarian government 
achieved using EU funding. The fact that Hungary needed to negotiate with the IMF is 
represented by a vague sentence omitting the word “IMF” and putting the blame on the 
previous left-wing government, quoted from a politician in the ministry of foreign affairs: 
“[…] by the time the crisis began, ‘the country was already in an impossible situation’, the 
exchequer was empty, so Hungary was the first member state in need of financial help”.92 
 
The ending of the excessive deficit procedure against Hungary is also described in terms of 
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the success of the current government. The accomplishments of the government are in part 
contributed to the fact that the Hungarian economic policies “became accepted”.93 By 
deleting the agent who carries out the action of accepting, it is generalised to mean that 
anyone and everyone accepts them. By building up a representation of the Hungarian 
government as a successful negotiator of its policies, Hungary becomes an actor that is 
unopposed by choice. 
 
Similar techniques are used whenever de-emphasising or omitting counterarguments would 
serve the cause of positive self-representation. This is best seen in the article entitled We 
Benefitted From the EU, where the economic progress of those countries joining the EU at 
the same time as Hungary is also dealt with.94 While Népszabadság went into details on 
regional development, GDPs, growing trade and detailing both the Visegrád group’s 
(Check Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the Baltic states’ progress, Magyar 
Nemzet focuses on only two aspects: the fact that Hungary is the biggest benefactor of EU 
funding, and that Hungary was ready to cooperate with these countries at the budgetary 
negotiations for 2014 to 2020.95 Again, by emphasising Hungary’s benefits and positive 
attitude, and by omitting contradicting data and de-emphasising the achievements of other 
states joining in 2004, an overall positive self-representation is achieved. The EU, again, is 
the economic benefactor that made the success of the Hungarian government’s economic 
policies possible. 
 
There is only one exception to this tendency, an article entitled The West Benefitted From 
the 2004 Enlargement.96 The article, describes several aspects of the 2004 enlargement to 
be beneficial to Western member states but negative to Eastern member states. These 
aspects all have to do with economic dependency of the Eastern states. The Eastern 
member states are referred to as “market outlets” which serve the economic development 
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of Western companies.97 Furthermore, the Eastern states are claimed to be “largely 
dependent on Western banks”.98 The final sentence of the article encourages Eastern states 
to “take their own fate into their hands”.99 The implications and meaning of this article is 
only possible to decipher with understanding the political context in which this fits. At first 
sight, this article seems to be going completely against the rest of the articles in the dataset. 
However, when related to the rest of the general discourse on Hungarian economic policies 
in Magyar Nemzet, it becomes clear that it serves a purpose. This might be described as a 
negative example, a warning, to show that in case the agenda of “strict economic policies” 
of the current government laid out in other articles would not be carried out,100 this might 
be the sad reality for the Eastern member states.  
 
 
4.1.2.1. Summary 
 
To understand what the above analysis means in terms of discourse on the EU and 
Hungarian EU-relations, van Dijk’s ideological square does come to use. The positive self-
representation of Hungary, which in this case is fully equivalent to the Hungarian 
government, and the EU as “the other” is detectable throughout the articles. However, the 
equation is not as simple as the positive self (Hungary) and the negative other (the EU). 
The analysis shows that the Hungarian membership is represented in positive terms 
motivated by the success of the Hungarian government in its EU-politics and any positive 
feature or action of the EU is represented to be down to the negotiating skills of the 
Hungarian government. Whenever the EU is represented in a negative light, it is because 
the EU is opposing the Hungarian government and is ignorant to the benefits of the 
Hungarian stance on the question. (I return to this tendency when discussing political 
aspects of EU membership as well.) 
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By focusing on the description of the Hungarian government as the actor within and in 
relation to the EU, the representation of the Hungarian government is deeply embedded 
into a representation of the EU. As it is revealed by the analysis, whenever the 
accomplishments of the government are cited, it is in connection with how successfully 
they managed in the EU. There is also another significance of this strategy of self-
representation, namely, that it takes away the focus from the EU as an actor and establishes 
it as an external influence that assumes the form of an economic benefactor. So the “other” 
in this sense is not an equally powerful actor but a source of Hungarian national progress. 
In this sense, the EU is de-emphasised in its political importance and structure and is 
backgrounded. This is supported by the omission of any voice in these articles criticising 
the Hungarian government from the angle of the EU.  
 
When criticism from the EU takes legal action, like the excessive deficit procedure, the 
description is formed to express that the Hungarian government already managed to 
address or even solve those problems. The overall message is that Hungary is doing well; 
whenever there is a dispute, it is solved, and the EU continues to fund Hungary and accept 
Hungarian economic policies. By legitimising Hungarian policies this way and presenting 
Hungary as an exclusive actor, the EU is represented as a mere container of nation states. 
Because the EU is reduced to an external influence, the main actor is the nation state and 
thus has the exclusive claim over economic progress or economic policies, even with the 
help of EU sponsorship. Because the Hungarian actions are cited imbedded in a 
representation of the EU, a complex picture is presented to the reader where decoding is 
complicated. As Magyar Nemzet is a right-wing newspaper, the readers might accept this 
representation of the successful Hungarian government readily, as they are already 
disposed to agree with the current right-wing government. 
 
 
4.2. The EU as a Political Actor 
 
The above discussion on Hungary as a nation state leads my discussion into the 
representation of the EU as a political actor. What kind of political actor the EU is claimed 
to be is relevant because public opinion takes this into account when deciding what 
influence the EU should or could have on their lives. This, in turn, might be important 
when they define themselves in relation to the EU as well. 
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In both sets of articles on Hungary’s tenth anniversary and on the Hungarian elections, 
there is a wealth of detail when attributing and representing the EU as a political actor. 
Népszabadság seems to give a quite nuanced picture of the EU in its articles. As I 
described above, however, the representation by Magyar Nemzet is slightly problematic in 
this sense, because the EU is not so much a political actor as rather a container. I develop 
this further here. Both Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet is consistent with their 
representations throughout, regardless which main topic (Hungarian elections or Hungary’s 
anniversary) is discussed. 
 
 
4.2.1. Népszabadság 
 
The EU as a political actor is depicted in two ways in Népszabadság: the political-
economic-democratic union whose members are able and willing to take part in its 
moulding, and the democratic union which is unable to enforce its values in its member 
states. The EU as a political-economic union whose members are willing to take part in its 
moulding appears mostly in the articles on the tenth anniversary of Hungary in the EU and 
only marginally in the articles on the Hungarian elections. This representation is achieved 
less by the topical structure of the articles and more by referencing, attributes, predication, 
presuppositions, implications, and metaphors. 
 
Referencing is important, according to Richardson, because it can have an impact on how 
actors are viewed. Identifying an actor by certain roles or characteristics chosen from a 
range of equally accurate roles and characteristics is a way to achieve emphasis the writer 
wants to achieve, as well as a way to signal relationships between actors. This choice also 
performs a function of projecting social values and social meaning onto the named.101 
Népszabadság invariably refers to the EU as “one of the biggest economic-political 
organisation in the world”, a “democratic club with 500 million members”, “economic-
political community” or an “economic-politic-democratic club. 102 103 104 105 All of these 
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names occur regularly in the texts. Looking at them closer, they are quite similar and 
project a few, emphasised, characteristics of the EU. By referring to the size of the EU both 
as one of the biggest organisations in the world and as a club with as many members as 
500 million, the representation achieves a connotation where sheer size seems to be a 
guarantee for value. After all, 500 million members is a huge number, and so many 
members cannot belong to the same “club” if there was something seriously wrong with it. 
Furthermore, the size of the organisation, referred to as one of the biggest in the world, 
connotes an impressive capacity as an actor.  
 
The adjectives that qualify the noun phrases (organisation, club, or polity) emphasise three 
qualities: economic, political and democratic. “Economic” is fairly unproblematic as the 
European Union started out as an economic organisation and still promotes economic 
values such as liberal market values and free trade. My analysis on the EU as an economic 
benefactor also showed that the connotation to this quality is overall positive because the 
EU is viewed as a source of economic benefits and help in economic progress.  
 
The other two qualities, political and democratic, carry a wider range of connotations. A 
political community suggests that the EU is a political actor. By establishing the EU as a 
political actor, it is emphasised that it has political powers and political legitimacy. Being a 
member in this political entity also assumes that Hungarian political allegiance lies with 
the EU (and not with anything else). This does not, by definition, suggest that the nation 
state is forgotten or melted into this entity, but since nothing contradicts this in the 
representation of the EU in Népszabadság, it seems that the prominence of the EU as a 
political actor is overarching and is emphasised above the nation state. This might be 
another way to express criticism to the Hungarian state headed by the current government, 
but also a way to suggest that political decisions and power is contributed to the EU as an 
alternative to the nation state. The third adjective, democratic, extends this line of thought. 
By emphasising the fact that the EU is a democratically operating organisation, the 
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connoted meanings of democracy are foregrounded.  
 
Népszabadság does bring up the assumed lack of democratic choice during the elections, 
and by foregrounding elsewhere that the EU is democratic, this might be a suggestion to an 
alternative where those unsatisfied with the current government can turn to.106 There is 
another aspect of these names describing the EU, namely, the connoted meaning of the 
noun phrases themselves. By describing the EU as an organisation, club or community, its 
nature as a social construction is emphasised. It is a representation that invites a 
connotation of a social entity where individuals are the building blocks of a community. 
This is an addition to the rather faceless and detached description of a political union 
which adds a dimension that suggest inclusiveness and social belonging, apart from 
political belonging. 
  
The second way of representing derives from the above, namely, that the EU is a 
democratic actor unable to enforce its values on its members. This representation is 
particularly salient in the articles discussing the Hungarian elections. This is expected since 
a left-leaning newspaper is bound to raise issues when a right-wing government wins the 
elections, but the matter goes much further than that. The criticism is explicitly aimed at 
the EU as a political actor, but implicitly aimed at the current government whose actions 
necessitate the debate on the abilities of the EU. The issue, therefore, is not only the 
representation of the EU as a weak promoter of democracy, but also the underlying 
suggestion that the nation state and nationalistic policies are against the very essence of 
democracy. 
 
This representation is achieved mainly by implications, presuppositions, predication and 
attribution that contrast these two political actors. The title of one of the articles, Europe is 
silent, is highly suggestive.107 The Hungarian word “néma” may have two denoted 
meanings here: “silent” by choice or “mute” because unable to speak. This ambiguity is 
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referred back to throughout the article. By suggesting that Europe, i.e., the EU, is silent by 
choice, it is implied that it either does not care or too careful to utter. To support this 
argument, Zalán claims that the avoidance may be down to the fact that the European 
elections are approaching and the European Commission “cannot start a battle with Viktor 
Orbán” because they attribute the power to Orbán to steal voters from the “total 
Eurosceptic” Jobbik for the European Parliament (EP) elections.108 It is also implied that 
avoiding confrontation with Orbán would give a higher number of mandates for the 
European People’s Party in the elections.109 This explicit criticism, however, also carries an 
implicit suggestion that the structure of the EU depends on the nation state and cooperation 
between the EU and its members.  
 
This leads into the other denoted meaning of the word “néma”, where the EU is silent 
because it is unable to speak. It is stated explicitly that wherever legal procedure was 
possible against the Hungarian government, it was done, which implies that legal 
procedures are the only viable way for the EU because it has no power of coercion.110 The 
sentence “[m]aybe from Brussels (or from somewhere else), something should be said as to 
why the rest of Europe views the decision of the Hungarian voters as the wrong direction” 
implies that the outcome of the election is viewed all over Europe as an error.111 
Furthermore, by inviting Brussels, or any other European capital, to comment on the 
proceedings, there is an indication that they should be able to have a say. Together with the 
suggestion that all viable solutions were already used, there is an indication that the EU is 
not acting because it cannot.  
 
The other dimension of this discussion is the critique aimed at the Hungarian government. 
There is also a presupposition in the above example, namely, that Hungarian voters have 
chosen the wrong direction. This becomes significant because it is not left as comment on 
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the internal affairs of Hungarian politics but is framed as a problem by European measures. 
As a result, the discussion is lifted onto the European level which, thus, is legitimised by 
attributing importance and relevance to it. The nation state, meanwhile, is being 
subordinated to the European level by suggesting that violating European-wide norms 
should be corrected. Supposing that Hungary was not part of the EU, the European norms 
could be cited as a point of comparison but never used to suggest that the behaviour of the 
nation state should be corrected after them. Given that Hungary is a member state, its 
political practices cannot avoid the relevance of the European norms the EU stands for.  
 
Further articles carry this implication as well.112 An article on the upcoming report by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Dési presents problematic 
elements during the national elections and describes that the European organisation is 
investigating these.113 This implies that the European opinion is influential, even when 
reporting on the national elections. Another article details an event in Brussels hosted by 
Rui Tavares and Ulrike Lunacek, where writer Karl Pfeifer read passages of his book and 
discussed Hungarian democracy and anti-Semitism.114 The article represents the discussion 
led by Tavares and Lunacek as a platform for expressing worries on current Hungarian 
tendencies, and connects its significance with the upcoming OSCE report on the Hungarian 
elections. This representation gives an impression that several issues of Hungarian politics 
are being addressed at the European level, strengthening the relevance of Hungarian 
politics in a European context. (This event is also described in Magyar Nemzet which I will 
return to in the relevant section later.) 
 
A further illustrative example of the significance of the European level interest in 
Hungarian politics is represented in an article entitled Fidesz paved the ground for 
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Jobbik.115 A citation from Financial Times describes that silence on the European side 
legitimises Orbán’s provocation against European liberal democracy. 116 It is accompanied 
by several warnings that without being able to enforce compliance with its democratic 
norms, the EU risks to disintegrate from within.117 Although the EU is not given a 
flattering representation, this does presuppose something worth noting: that the EU is 
expected to be promoting democratic values and democratic governance not only on its 
own level of operation, but among the member states as well. By lamenting its failure to 
live up to this expectation, Népszabadság suggests that the EU should be equipped with 
tools to make sure that member states comply with its norms.  
 
 
4.2.1.1. Summary 
 
The above analysis shows that Népszabadság builds a discourse on the political nature of 
the EU that is based on positive connotations: democracy, social membership and 
legitimate political power. In addition, according to Népszabadság, the EU should be given 
more power as a political actor even if this power would challenge the nation state. De-
legitimising the nation state by implying that it does not promote those democratic values 
that are so positively connoted, and legitimising the EU as a political actor precisely 
because it is associated with those positive values creates a shift in the power structures 
between the EU and its member states. Placing more power to the supra-national actor 
could possibly weaken the power of the nation state. This might be exactly what sovereign 
states want to avoid. However, the fact that the discussion is extended not only on the 
Hungarian but also on the European level shows that negotiating ways and practices is on-
going. It shows that the process of power negotiation is not finished and that actors do 
influence each other. However, supranational power is given to the EU by its member 
states for now, and it is tied to legal procedures when it decides to interfere in a nation 
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state. 
 
 
4.2.2. Magyar Nemzet  
 
The representation of the EU as a political actor in Magyar Nemzet is the clear opposite to 
Népszabadság. The analysis on the economic aspect of EU membership showed in Magyar 
Nemzet that the EU is represented less as an actor and more as an external influence. 
Analysis from the political point of view confirms this, but also extends it further. Both the 
articles on the tenth anniversary of Hungary in the EU and on the Hungarian elections treat 
the subject of the political power of the EU. The EU is represented as an external power 
whose dominance must be avoided at any cost and as a source of unfounded accusations 
and criticism. Both representations serve the aim to strengthen the importance of the nation 
state, i.e., the government, and to imply that external influence is dangerous to Hungarian 
sovereignty and the well-being of Hungarian people. 
 
The way that EU is referred to supports the above most clearly. There are two main 
strategies within this category. The first is where the EU is referred to as a unit and the 
second is where EU-politicians are singled out as actors. In an article discussing Hungary’s 
anniversary in the EU, the EU is referred to as a “company formally based on equal 
rights”, and EU governance is described as weakening to sovereignty.118 Naming the entity 
a “company” suggests that it is an economic, rather than a social or political cooperation. 
By implying that it is based on equal rights only formally, the EU is suggested to be a 
collection of member states whose rights are unequally distributed in practice. Stier goes 
further than this and describes the difference between member states not so much to be a 
quality distinction but to be down to political power which decides whether a state is 
strong or weak.119 The claim that the responsibility for Hungary’s weakness does not lie by 
Brussels is followed by an encouragement to prove Hungary’s strength by action.120 
                                                 
118 
Stier, ”Földre Szállt Álmok,” 
 
119 
Ibid. 
 
120 
Ibid. 
 
40 
 
 
Furthermore, by describing EU governance as weakening to sovereignty, it is implied that 
a state may be strengthened if it takes actions against the interference of EU governance.121 
In addition to this ominous pronouncement, there is, again, an ideological divide between 
“us” and “them” throughout the article. Hungary and the Hungarian government is treated 
as one entity and is referred to as “we”, “us” and “our”.122 (Although Hungarian does not 
require to use pronouns, the inflection of words shows that the author refers to “we”, “us” 
and “our”.) The trend of depicting the EU as an external influence rather than an actor 
itself reoccurs here as well. The EU, thus, is stripped of its political nature and is even 
represented as threat to “us”, the nation state.123 
 
The alternative to referring to the EU as unit is naming EU politicians. These politicians 
are overwhelmingly represented to be criticising or worrying about Hungarian policies and 
as opposed to the EU as a unit, they are given the status of actors. At the few occasions 
when this is not their function, then they are cited to be impressed by how well the 
government managed to respond to their criticisms. Especially the articles on the 
Hungarian elections show this. Both before and after the election, reports on international 
reaction included quoting criticism from individuals.124 In an article entitled Are the 
European Critics of the Orbán-government Subduing? one week after the election, “[o]nly 
Daniel-Cohn Bendit is worried about Hungarian democracy in Strasbourg” and “Hannes 
Swoboda commentates almost positively”.125 Furthermore, “critical, vilifying voices” from 
the European Parliament are also reported to be subduing.126 The figure of Daniel-Cohn 
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Bendit, which is given the role of the last person in Strasbourg to be worrying about 
Hungary is described in detail, while other voices who are represented to be not critical 
anymore are not specified any further. The function of specifying further details on Daniel-
Cohn Bendit is to de-legitimise him. He is referred to as a “blustering politician”, and 
“unrelenting critic” and a “soon-to-be pensioner”. 127 By being referenced like these, 
Daniel-Cohn Bendit is stripped of his professional capabilities as a politician. Blustering 
and unrelenting refer to someone without the capability to negotiate and listen to reason, 
and the fact that he is reaching retiring age is mentioned to suggest that his opinions will 
not be relevant in the near future. However, even with his de-legitimised voice, he is 
represented as an actor, while the European Parliament in the same article is represented to 
be a forum of critical and vilifying voices, unnamed and actionless.128 
 
Another example appears in an article describing an event happening in Brussels lead by 
Rui Tavares and Ulrike Lunacek. The event is to introduce a book written by Karl 
Pfeifer.129 The book is only referred to once in the whole article as “by the way, it does not 
seem to have too much to do with Hungary”.130 Instead, Tavares and Lunacek are named 
several times. Tavares is referred to as an “ex-communist” and the author of a report about 
Hungary that was “full of countless slips and errors”.131 Lunacek is described as a green 
party politician who “have burst out against our home country many times as well”.132 
 
The impression of a powerless EU is further strengthened by how action is allocated across 
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the texts. The voices representing the EU are assigned actions with negative connotations 
and examples are plentiful throughout, but are most prominent in texts on the Hungarian 
election. The most distinct of these is an article entitled After 6 April, published on 3 April, 
which details accusations that have not even been said yet.133 The topic is the expectation 
of international election monitors to arrive to Hungary for the 6 April elections and their 
report of the election later. “We can only hope that they will do a thorough and objective 
work just as before. If it did not happen that way, Fidesz must be prepared, if they do not 
want to govern in an international headwind another four years, since down here even 
victory needs to be accounted for”.134 These two sentences exemplify the whole article, 
especially because the first sentence appears twice, at the beginning and at the end of the 
article. By stating that “we can only hope” it is implied that it is less than evident that 
international monitors do a thorough and objective work. The hypothetical scenario 
includes two presuppositions: that Fidesz is to win the elections and that they have been 
governing against international obstacles so far. Presupposing that Fidesz would win the 
elections three days before the elections presents this as an unquestionable, decided fact, 
especially since no alternative is presented in the article. The second presupposition, that 
the last four years were rendered more difficult by foreign obstacles suggests that 
governance in Hungary is difficult because of foreign influence. To underline this, several 
foreign commentators are cited, among them Vivien Reding, who is claimed to have said 
she will do everything to weaken the legitimacy of the results of the Hungarian 
elections.135 Her denial of this is framed to be a “statement appearing to be a refutation”.  
This formulation suggests that she did not deny it after all.136 
 
The motif of negative foreign influence on Hungarian governance appears often and so 
does the representation of Hungary, i.e., Viktor Orbán, working to repair this harmful 
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influence and protect against further damage to Hungary.137 Wherever negative comments 
or criticism is reported on, it is Orbán or the Hungarian government, or Hungary that acts, 
while the EU is represented to be actionless. Where the EU is mentioned, it is associated 
with actions happening to it as a passive entity, mostly by the Hungarian state. It is 
remarkable that Magyar Nemzet does not, at any point, make a difference between 
Hungary and the Hungarian government and nor do they separate Hungarian action from 
Viktor Orbán’s actions. The action in relation to the EU are, thus, represented by the action 
carried out on the EU, by Hungary. Hungary is described to have “proven to be working 
for the common European goals”, “emerged from the excessive deficit procedure” (as 
opposed to the EU stopping the procedure against Hungary), “made a commitment to 
implement the judgement from the European Court of Justice” (as opposed to the European 
Court of Justice passing a judgment) and “been prepared to enter into dialogue”.138 139 140 
141 Hungary is further represented be “correcting criticism”, “expressing itself more 
powerful and conducting itself more determined”, “if necessary, protecting the Hungarian 
cause in Brussels” and finally that Hungary supports EU membership. 142 143 144 145 This 
last point, that Hungary is supporting EU membership or that it does not wish to leave the 
EU occurs in a context that specifies the condition under which this is relevant: “there is a 
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need for a Europe where member states are strong and cooperate on those areas where the 
cooperation serves the needs of citizens. This cooperation should be coordinated by strong 
European institutions”.146 The first sentence suggests that the EU should be composed of 
strong nation states that are only cooperating in those areas where it serves their citizens 
and not in areas where it does not serve the national interest, thus limiting its scope and 
power. The second sentence might seem to be flattering to the EU, but those EU 
institutions that are supposed to be strong are only those that serve strong nation states. 
Thus, the EU becomes subordinated to nation states and its existence is only desired as 
long as the nation states can decide what areas it should function in. Again, the actor is the 
nation state, and the EU is represented to be where the action is carried out. Even if the EU 
is given the function of coordinating, this power stems from the nation state, which, thus is 
in control of its actions. 
 
 
4.2.2.1. Summary 
 
The EU’s role defined by Magyar Nemzet is that of a weak, actionless container. Where 
political actors are presented and discussed, it is only Hungary that is represented to be a 
legitimate political actor, while the EU is reduced to be a subordinated servant. Where the 
EU is associated with action, then this is carried out by individual politicians representing 
the EU and never by the political entity of the EU. The importance of elevating individual 
politicians to the position of actors is significant because it has a function. If individuals 
are acting separately and on their own accord, then their actions are not as significant 
because they are less powerful political actors compared to the state. By giving individuals 
the possibility to represent political power, while depriving the EU of its political power as 
a legitimate actor, the negative voices and criticisms that are aimed at the government’s 
policies are weakened. If the EU as a politically powerful actor would be voicing these, the 
level of importance and influence contributed to them would also rise. However, since they 
are voiced by de-legitimised individuals, they become considerably less important. These 
individuals are represented with references or attributes with a negative connotation that 
strips them of their professional capacity. When they are described to be praising Hungary, 
they are only represented by this action and no references, attributes or any other negative 
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connotations. 
 
The fact, however, that it is emphasised that they are EU politicians also serves a function. 
Their weakened criticism does represent the EU, but in a powerless way. The identification 
of “us”, the nation, and “them”, the EU, builds up a rhetoric where national political 
representatives clash with foreign political representatives. Thus, Viktor Orbán, the 
representative of “us” is elevated to the status of the protector of national values while the 
EU becomes “the other”, criticising and interfering with the government’s work for 
Hungary. 
 
The actions represented in the text also have an implication to the nature of the EU as a 
political actor. The emphasis on Hungary as an actor is paired with de-emphasising the EU 
as an actor. Those individuals that represent action from the side of the EU are also de-
legitimised by describing their performance as doubtfully fair or by suggesting their 
harmfulness to Hungary. The construction of the Hungarian state as the victim of the 
foreign meddlers is also strengthened by the description of the Hungarian government as 
the successful actor in the face of these difficulties. This strategy of positive self-
representation is achieved by using verbs with positive connotations in relation to Hungary. 
This associates the Hungarian actions with a positive attitude against those with a negative 
attitude. Even in relation to the EU, Hungary is represented to be the actor while the EU is 
reduced to be the subordinate subject of these actions. This is further confirmed by a 
description of the EU on and in which nation states carry out their actions. The EU is only 
required to act in the servitude of the nation state, and only in those instances when this is 
desired by the nation state. Since this is the description of the Hungarian government’s 
approach to EU politics for the next four years, it is presumable that EU-Hungarian 
relations will be based on Hungary’s resistance to further political integration and further 
opposition to the widening of the EU’s scope and function. 
 
Another important aspect of the representation in Magyar Nemzet is the fact, that there is 
no difference made between Hungary and the Hungarian government. These are 
interchangeable both in referencing strategies and the description of actions. Their identity 
melts together and they both become one entity and one actor. This is also noticeable 
wherever the pronoun “we” and its derivates (“us”, “our”) are used in relation to Hungary, 
the nation state, the Hungarian government and the Hungarian people. This, in effect, 
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achieves a representation where state and government are not separated anymore and 
where Hungarian citizens are equal to their representatives in politics. This representation 
of Hungarian citizens being one with Hungary, and Hungary being one with the Hungarian 
government, the identity of Hungarian citizens is monopolised to one understanding and to 
one political party. Since the EU is described to be inferior to Hungary, its nature, its 
politics and its very existence is treated to be below the level of Hungary’s power and 
ability to act. This forms an allegiance where the best interest of the citizens, both 
explicitly and implicitly, is claimed to be fulfilled by the Hungarian government and not by 
the EU. By forming this allegiance, Hungarian national identity is represented to be fairly 
exclusive in relation to the EU. 
 
The question might arise, then, why the Hungarian government still supports EU 
membership. The answer lies in my analysis on the economic aspect of membership and 
the representation of the EU as an economic benefactor. The representation of the 
Hungarian government showed that it is described to be the successful negotiator for EU 
funding and economic benefits arriving from the EU. The EU, although reduced to be less 
than a powerful actor here as well, was represented to be an economic benefactor. This 
way, it was the Hungarian government that was depicted to be a political actor working for 
Hungary’s economic development, while the EU was depicted as a mere assistant in this 
process. There is a key momentum in this representation. Although the EU membership is 
characterised by economic benefits, the action that was carried out in order to achieve this 
progress still lies with the nation state and thus the Hungarian government. This associates 
the Hungarian government to be the one that secures the EU funding and thus economic 
progress and not the EU itself. EU funding is the tool, but the actor remains the state. The 
Hungarian government, thus, becomes indispensable for economic progress. By 
emphasising its crucial importance in the process, the government secures citizens’ 
allegiance as well. Since the Hungarian public, by and large, is aware of the economic 
benefits EU membership entails, as it is continually repeated in all the articles analysed, it 
is not conceivable for the government to abandon this source of development. However, to 
avoid losing political power, it needs to secure that citizens view the EU as less powerful 
than the state. By reducing the EU to be the tool for this success, the representation 
eliminates the chance for changing alliances towards the EU in place of the nation state. 
Instead, the Hungarian state is represented to be the one that is responsible for bringing EU 
benefits to the citizens. 
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4.3. Implications to the Future of European Integration and EU-Hungarian Relations 
 
Although it is a difficult task, there may be some general assumptions made on the basis of 
the above analysis. As the dataset is limited because both the time frame of the collection 
and the number of sources are limited, it is not possible to suggest that my findings are 
universal, rather to be representing a small chunk of the whole. However, I consider my 
findings an appropriate starting point on a discussion on the future of European integration 
and EU-Hungarian relations. This stems from the very nature of discourse and discourse 
analysis: society and discourse mutually shape each other. As this is a continual process of 
negotiation, the implications that are found by discourse analysis may be used to 
understand implications on how societal structures are developing. My specific findings, 
therefore, may show, however small, indications as to how this development may continue. 
 
To be able to relate my findings to the overall topic of European integration and EU-
Hungarian relations, they need to be related to the social realities they are embedded in. 
According to Fairclough, texts are a constitutive part of the social world but their effect on 
social reality depends on aspects such as power and context.147 Van Dijk suggests that the 
power of discourse to shape social reality is not coercive but mental. Controlling the minds 
(knowledge, attitude and beliefs) results in individuals acting as if on their own accord and 
this is done through discourse.148 This means that discourse has a shaping effect on 
European integration because it prompts individuals to shape their beliefs and attitudes 
according to how discourse is constructed on the subject.  
 
Although my analysis was based on only two newspapers in Hungary, these newspapers 
are the largest ones so their representations are significant in shaping social reality. 
Representational strategies of Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet are different, but the 
overall outcome is consistent in the respective newspapers. This means that when 
describing representations of a certain newspaper, I am able to generalise to a certain 
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extent as well. 
 
The analysis of Népszabadság showed that EU-Hungarian relations are represented to be 
based on an economic-political relationship in which the EU is represented to be a 
powerful actor. The Hungarian government, on the other hand, is subtly and implicitly 
criticised for its inability to take better advantage of Hungary’s EU membership and is 
suggested to be far away from reaching European standards both economically and 
politically. By emphasising that the EU is a democratically governed social community, 
Népszabadság connotes social and political benefits with an alliance with the EU. 
Furthermore, originating from the implicit criticism of Hungarian governance, there are 
implications to the superiority of the EU’s democratic governance as opposed to that of the 
Hungarian state. This might prompt readers to consider by-passing national alliances and 
appeal directly to the European level both for economic and political benefits that the state 
is failing to provide. For the future of European integration, this representation has many 
details that might be significant. 
 
First of all, the balance of power between the nation state and the EU is represented to be 
slightly in favour of the EU which suggests that European politics weighs more in citizens’ 
everyday lives. This does not necessarily mean that nation state is outdated as a political 
power, rather that it does not influence every political domain anymore.  
 
Secondly, by the fact the European Union is given the status of a political actor, readers are 
prompted to accept the legitimacy of European  decision-making, thereby enabling a better 
compliance of citizens with EU regulations. Accepting the legitimacy of the EU also means 
that citizens are less likely to oppose political influence and power associated with the EU 
as well.  
 
Thirdly, by representing the EU as a social-democratic community, readers may evaluate 
the EU as both a social and a political construction. By adding a social dimension to the 
political one, citizens presented with the conception that the EU is a community where 
membership is based on social inclusion. This, in turn, suggests that the EU is a social 
construction where citizens are able to influence its nature and future development. 
Overall, these basic implications derived from the representation of the EU in 
Népszabadság suggest a rather pro-European attitude. This positive attitude suggests that 
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future support for further European integration is likely among the readers of 
Népszabadság. As to the question of the future of Hungary’s membership, this general 
support for the European Union is likely to be too insignificant. As Népszabadság is 
associated with the left-wing ideology, its readership might not weigh much in the shaping 
of the overall national attitude since support for left-wing politics in Hungary is at an all-
time low. 
 
The analysis of Magyar Nemzet, on the other hand, shows a very different outcome. 
Representational strategies in Magyar Nemzet result in an image of the EU as a politically 
powerless container of nation states and as an economic benefactor. The nation state, on 
the other hand, is represented to be the successful negotiator of economic benefits from the 
EU and a strong political actor in relation to the EU. As a result, the EU is represented to 
be a mere assistant or simply a harmful foreign influence in Hungarian politics. Both of 
these representations serve to emphasise the importance of the nation state and to de-
emphasise the EU as a political actor. This representation suggests three implications to the 
future of the EU-integration process and to EU-Hungarian relations.  
 
Firstly, by reducing the nature of the EU to be an assistant of Hungarian politics, rather 
than an equally potent political actor may prompt citizens to dismiss or refuse European 
political influence on their everyday lives. Since the EU’s image as a powerful political 
actor is greatly weakened, any political power is associated with the nation state instead. 
This may result in citizens strengthening their alliances with the nation state and deny 
further identification with an external influence. The result is a rather exclusive identity 
politics which favours national identities and dismisses the relevance of any other type of 
political identification.  
 
Secondly, as the EU is not given the status of a political actor and thus citizens’ alliance, 
further European integration is difficult to conceive, or in this case, is even opposed to. The 
representation of the ideal function of the EU is for it to be an assistant to help the 
cooperation of nation states. Even this function is preferred to be limited by the nation 
state. In this climate, readers are suggested that it is not desirable to strengthen the political 
influence of the EU. Furthermore, by depicting the EU already as a threat at this stage of 
European integration, citizens are likely to be opposed to widening the scope of European 
influence as well.  
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Thirdly, there is an implication that EU-Hungarian relations will not change much in the 
next years, at least not towards a strengthened support for the EU. The Hungarian 
government is depicted to be keen on sustaining its current influence in Hungary and 
resistant to deeper cooperation with the EU. By melting Hungarian politics, the Hungarian 
state and Hungarian citizens into one entity, Magyar Nemzet represents the interests of the 
current government to be the interest of the state which is in turn represented to be the 
interests of Hungarian citizens. By creating an image of the government as the architect of 
successful EU-politics and as the successful winner of economic benefits from the EU, 
citizens are prompted that their allegiance is in good hands with the government, as they 
are working for the benefit of Hungary. However, as my analysis showed that the economic 
benefits of being an EU member is a key component in this equation, it is possible to 
assume that the Hungarian attitude towards EU membership largely depends on this aspect. 
Citizens are likely to support EU membership in the future if economic progress is the 
consequence of this. Meanwhile, the Hungarian government is likely to continue its 
rhetoric to be the successful negotiator for EU funding which would win them popular 
votes as well. By embedding the representation of the Hungarian government as a crucial 
element of receiving EU funding and of economic progress, the Hungarian government did 
not only win votes but also established itself as an indispensable element for the well-being 
of Hungary and its citizens. In addition, it has also established a rhetoric that unites the 
identity of Hungary, its government and its citizens. In this climate, there is little chance 
that European allegiance can develop much further. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I set out to examine the representations of the EU and the representation of EU-Hungarian 
relations in the two largest dailies in Hungary, Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet. My aim 
with this investigation was to gain an insight into discourses on the EU and EU-Hungarian 
relations in the Hungarian media. During my data collection period, 1 March and 5 May, 
two main topics were salient in my chosen newspapers: the Hungarian national elections 
and the tenth anniversary of Hungary as an EU member. They have, therefore, created the 
ground for my dataset for discourse analysis. 
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My analysis revealed a wealth of details in both newspapers. However, the most important 
aspect of these two separate topics is that they both contributed to the same, linear 
representations in both newspapers. This shows that not so much the specific topic, but 
rather the context of the topics decided the outcome of the analysis. By the context of the 
topics, I refer to van Dijk’s definition of global contexts, which means the overall social, 
political and cultural structure the texts are embedded in.149 This also implies that the 
particular discourses I investigated were not isolated but were shaped by wider influences 
than the topics themselves. My analysis and my discussion showed, however, that it is not 
only discourse that is shaped by context, but also that discourse shapes social reality. 
Although I investigated only a sliver of the Hungarian discourse in these newspapers, my 
findings could be applied to address my initial research question. 
 
The analysis of the discourse in Népszabadság, the largest left-leaning daily in Hungary, 
revealed a pro-European attitude that is strengthened by a dissatisfaction with the current 
right-wing government. The discourse on the EU and EU-Hungarian relations is shaped by 
a representation of the EU as an economic-political union that is based on democratic 
principles and evokes a sense of social belonging. Although criticism of the Hungarian 
government was subtle and only achieved by implication, the outcome was a 
representation of the nation state as a less powerful political actor. This, and the portrayal 
of the current government failing its citizens both socially and economically, suggested a 
more positive attitude towards political and social citizenship in the EU. Furthermore, it 
suggests that citizens’ allegiances might bring a more beneficial outcome if they were 
placed with the EU instead of the nation state. National identities, thus are complemented 
with an inclusive, social and political identification with the EU. This might bring a more 
positive attitude towards the EU as a political actor and to the further deepening of the 
European integration process. The only hindrance to this is the fact that support for the 
political left in Hungary has dropped to extremely low levels, so this pro-European attitude 
might not be relevant to the larger portion of society. 
 
The analysis of the discourse in Magyar Nemzet, on the other hand, revealed quite 
contrasting attitudes. The EU, according to my findings, is portrayed as powerless actor in 
relation to the Hungarian government, which in this newspaper was used synonymously 
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with the Hungarian state and Hungarian citizens. The EU was reduced to be an economic 
benefactor and a coordinating assistant between sovereign nation states. Instead, it was the 
strength and ability of the state that was emphasised. Hungarian economic progress was 
described to be the success of the current government, where the EU functioned as an 
external economic benefactor. When political cooperation between the EU and Hungary 
was discussed, it was only the Hungarian state that was presented as political actor, while 
the EU was diminished to be the coordinating assistant of national politics among its 
member states through its institutions. By presenting European-wide criticism of Hungary 
by the voices of individual European politicians, the legitimacy of these criticisms was also 
reduced because they were not produced by powerful political actors, although still 
represented the EU. However, when criticism from the EU resulted in legal procedures, the 
reporting presented how successfully the Hungarian government responded and 
cooperated. This positive self-representation and the negative representation of a de-
legitimised EU produced a rather unbalanced power-relation. Hungary, as the nation state, 
was represented to be the only successful political actor, leaving no option for citizens to 
build allegiance to the European level. This was paired with the representation of the 
Hungarian state embedded into European level politics, which rendered the nation state 
indispensable in relation to the EU. My findings also show that the economic benefits of 
being an EU-member helped develop the Hungarian economy. The current government 
utilises this and represent this crucial aspect of EU membership to be attributed to their 
hard work for their citizens. The continued representation of Hungary as a strong, 
successful state overshadows any political-social aspects of the EU. This means that while 
the nation monopolises representations and allegiance of their citizens, it is likely to 
continue an exclusive national identity formation process where the European level is 
insignificant. 
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